

Favoritism in the Turkish Educational System: Nepotism, Cronyism and Patronage

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Abstract

In almost all systems there have been unethical behaviors that take place in written and visual media. Of all these unethical behaviors, favoritism takes precedence. This study was conducted to investigate whether or not the administrators favor some people in the Turkish national education system and also to reveal the teachers' thoughts on whether or not the administrators (central, provincial, and school administrators) show favoritism in their decisions and practices. In the study, a scale was constructed to collect data, and its validity and reliability were checked. After a group of teachers tested the scale, the results indicated that the teachers tend to believe that central, provincial and school administrators are partial in favor of some people in the Turkish national education system. Teachers believe that favoritism has existed in the following areas: the appointment of central administrators in the ministry of national education, in school administrators and teachers, in providing educational materials for schools, in selecting schools to take part in activities, in promoting teachers to a higher position or appointing them to positions abroad; about tendering investments in the provincial education administration, in opening private schools, courses and institutions, in the distribution of funds to schools, as well as the use of buildings, establishments and materials provided by the ministry; in the practice of school administrators about the tolerance for teachers' having permission for any reasons, in teachers beginning courses and leaving classrooms on time, and finally in selecting participants for activities from which they can benefit financially and academically. Participants believe that administrators neglect skills and abilities, and that they behave show favoritism about the issues mentioned above in favor of their friends, fellow countrymen, and those having political views that align with their own.

Keywords: Administrator, Favoritism, Nepotism, Cronyism, Patronage, Ethics

Introduction

Favoritism occurs when a civil servant helps his/her relatives illegally and unjustly, backs them (Özsemerci, 2002), or treats anyone or any group of people better than others regardless of their high professional performance. In other words, it is favoritism when undeserving people are promoted, when they earn more money than those who do the same job, or when tardiness is permitted at work. Favoritism is treating someone in a different manner not because of his/her competence at work but because of reasons irrelevant to the matter, or because of his/her personal interests. If there is a chance for an employee to be promoted “without deserving it,” even illegally, if something happens “behind closed doors” about the selection of personnel for various development programs, if there are two employees with the same competence and performance in the profession, and if one of them has attended an accelerated program but is not selected, if she/he is deprived of any promotion regardless of his/her performance in the profession, favoritism is likely to exist (Employee Favoritism, 2006). Favoritism displays the personal choices of those who can make decisions in administration. Moreover, it is the result of the struggle to show their political views and power (Kwon, 2005).

Favoritism, a reality in many countries, shows underdevelopment in democracy and is a major reason for lack of productivity (Kim, 2004). Favoritism harms justice as it gives advantages to undeserving people and as it damages people’s good intentions and ruins the transparency of governments’ employment and agreement processes. The most important dilemma caused by favoritism is that many people do not perceive it as a problem (Nadler and Schulman, 2006).

The relations in an office are unlikely to be “equal”. It is quite natural to treat a person positively who has the same interests and good relations with others. Apparently, there is nothing wrong in such a situation. However, problems may arise if (Morettini, 2005):

1. Good relations and shared interests cause an administrator to behave favorably towards an employee.
2. An administrator behaves clearly and unjustly in favor of one employee and pretends not to consider others.
3. Nepotism, the grandfather of favoritism, occurs.

Aristotle stated that all communities aimed at “the good” thing and take “the best” as a goal (Aristotle, 1983). Getting “the best” reveals the obligation for a universal concept of ethics. Universal ethics organize the necessities that an individual lives in harmony with his social, economic, and ecological environment. In fact, the fundamental function of ethics is to guide harmonic behaviors required to live together (Akkoyunlu, 1998).

Unethical behaviors consist of either activities that go against the legal norms of the country and thus the criminal justice system, or ones that oppose the basic moral norms the society is based on. There are three types of unethical behaviors in administration. They are: (Baydar, 2005)

- a) Unethical behaviors inclined towards the use of personal force (keeping civil servants under constraints, insulting them, behaving in such a way as to daunt them and instill fear in order to get services done more quickly);
- b) Unethical behaviors inclined towards the assurance of financial benefits (bribes, embezzlement, theft, and crime in general);

- c) Unethical behaviors inclined towards the use of official status.

This study deals with unethical behaviors which bear favoritism and experiences in the process of conducting educational services within the context of using official power. These are nepotism, cronyism, and patronage.

Nepotism

The term ‘nepotism’ is derived from the word *nepot* (nephew) in Latin. Nowadays, it is described as helping one’s relatives find work in one’s own office. Moreover, it is described in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as a form of “favoritism shown to a nephew and other relatives, by giving them positions because of their relationship rather than their merit” (Abdalla, Maghrabi, & Raggad, 1998).

Hayajenh, Maghrabi, and Al-Dabbagh (1994) list the reasons of nepotism in Arabic countries as follows (these can also apply to Turkey because of its social and cultural similarity with the Arab countries):

- a) *Socio-cultural structure*: The origins of socio-cultural structure in the Arab world are based on kinship and tribal relations. Thus, an individual’s merits and norms require him/her to fulfill responsibilities towards his/her family, which encourages nepotic behavior.
- b) *Economic structure*: Weak economic structure of some Arab countries causes a limited number of labor markets. Moreover their economy is based on agriculture and restricted industry, leading to high unemployment rates. Thus, competing for limited work opportunities and trying to get jobs by means of family relations causes nepotism.
- c) *Educational structure*: In many countries, dominant opinion inspires students to get an education in traditional fields rather than technical ones in needed industries. Such an educational system creates imbalance in the business markets. Therefore, nepotism plays a significant role in getting a job.
- d) *Political structure*: The public sector in independent Arab states is the best way to obtain a job. Members of the state help relatives and friends find jobs in the public sector or in military institutions.

It is known that nepotism brings about negative attitudes of the personnel towards the organization and decreases their devotion to their jobs, which handicaps the productivity and success of an organization (Abdalla, Maghrabi, & Raggad, 1998). Furthermore, nepotism causes the loss of competent administrators in the organization and makes it difficult to find new candidates (Wong & Kleiner, 1994).

Cronyism

Favoring someone due to friendship status is called “cronyism” (Pektaş, 1999). “Fellow countrymen favoritism”, which is widespread in Turkey, can be assessed as a special kind of cronyism, too (Özsemerci, 2002). Competence principles (talent/ability/success/level of education) are not taken into consideration when cronyism exists; that is, when a civil servant makes a special effort, helps his/her friends to get jobs in public institutions and organizations, and promotes them in the profession, using some facilities (dwelling, employment in foreign countries, etc.), or appoints them to another job (Aktan, 2006). Cronyism both decreases reliance on social institutions and increases egoism. It destroys the

importance of doing good deeds for others. Moreover, cronyism entails degeneration that is, the use of public goods for personal benefits (Khatri, Tsang, & Begley, 2006).

Patronage

When the political party that forms the government removes the top managers in public institutions and organizations from office and appoints new ones based on political advocacy, ideology, nepotism, or cronyism, it is called “patronage” (Pektaş, 1999).

In other words, favoritism is experienced in three ways. These are: nepotism, cronyism, and patronage. Nepotism means favoring only relatives in all positions, cronyism is favoring only companions and friends in every position, and patronage means that governing political party appoints their friends and relatives to only high positions not lower positions.

It is known that administrators should obey ethical principles using their authority in the appointments or shifting. As is known, the authority given to the administrations is classified as dependency and appreciation. If the administration is wanted to do a particular thing or to behave in a particular way, there is dependent authority. If the administration is tolerated in doing something or carrying out an order, there is appreciation authority (Gözübüyük, 1983; Dönmez, 2003).

The principles of law organizing the activities of administration and derived from various sources cannot arrange all the details. The law may give freedom of appreciation to an administration that has to meet different needs and activities about the determination of types, times and places of activities. This freedom range/scope law given the administration constitutes the appreciation scope. Based on this authority, the administration chooses one of the activities. The authority decides to issue or not to issue any decree, and an administrator can act in respect of his/her consideration if the law does not do so (Onar, 1942).

In spite of the close dependency to law, administration is known to have an evaluation or discretionary power for acts in every step. Therefore the administration tries to carry out abstract and general rules by other abstract and general processes such as regulations and codes. Every transition to detail and every approach to the concrete would lead to new determinations and evaluations; administrators would use the aforementioned power step by step from the top decision organ in the administration to offices carrying out concrete practice procedures. Thus, discretionary power occurs because of an obligation. However, it is sometimes too broad. For instance, the law often gives freedom to administration in the selection of act, time, and place. Say that a school is going to be built. It is often impossible for policymakers to determine when and where to build it. The administration will determine it. Nevertheless, the administrators do not use the authority justly when financial benefits, advocacy, or favoritism are involved. For example, it can be said that an administrator chooses a specific place to reward people in the region or to make a field worthy. Appreciation should be limited with the aim (Yayla, 1985).

Therefore, administrators should use their appreciation authority ethically. Otherwise, it causes negative perceptions although the procedures are legal.

As a matter of fact, Bayhan (2002) indicates that nepotism, cronyism and patronage are still valid powers on the basis of his research “Sociological Profile of University Youth-

2001” through which %90 of 3223 university students agreed with that “In Turkey working doesn’t bring success but favoritism brings”.

Problem

As far as the importance of the existence of favoritism in the central and provincial administration in the Ministry of National Education, it is also crucial what the 572 thousand people (administrators and teachers) working in central and provincial organizations of the ministry of Turkish National Education think about such practices. This study tries to reveal teachers’ perceptions as to whether or not present administrators apply favoritism in various activities and practices (including promotions and appointments to various positions) in educational organizations. In this context, the problem of the research is to reveal teacher perceptions whether the educational and administrative practice of favoritism has existed in different units of the Turkish educational system.

Aim of the study *is* to reveal whether favoritism is experienced in the activities of central administrators of the National Education Ministry, provincial education administrators and school administrators, or not.

The most crucial limitation of the research is that all gained data, findings, and results are limited to the practices that National Education has carried out for the last five years.

Methodology

In this research, a survey model is used to describe the present form of a situation and the position of an event, an individual, or an object as it exists. The population of the research includes primary and secondary education schools in service of Kayseri Melikgazi District National Education Directorate and the teachers employed in these schools. There are 85 public primary schools (with totally 1327 teachers) and 23 secondary schools (with a total of 1323 teachers) in the mentioned district. Due to the abundance of the population of the research in number, sampling is used.

Sampling number was determined to be 335 on the basis of Krijcie and Morgan (1970, p.607-610)’s criteria to set sampling extent for educational researches. In order to reach this number, 35 primary school and 12 secondary school teachers were contacted via systematic sampling, a kind of probabilistic sampling.

The scale was distributed to the aforementioned schools by 13 students pursuing M.A. degrees at Erciyes University in the Institute of Social Sciences and taking the course Scientific Research Techniques and was collected in the same way. The scale was to be returned within a week. Moreover, the teachers teaching during the week that the scale was applied and volunteers to fill in the scale were interviewed. The number of the respondents is 288.

The Development of the Data Collecting Tool

A scale was developed to collect data for the research. The steps below were followed: First of all, the researcher searched the literature on ethics, favoritism, nepotism, cronyism, and patronage. Afterwards, 20 teachers who are going on master education at the Social Sciences Institute of Erciyes University attended this researcher’s lectures on Scientific

Research Methods and at the same time working at schools of the National Education Ministry were asked to explain their ideas about favoritism.

A draft with 67 items was prepared as a result of the data gained from the literature. Next, an expert was consulted about the level of adequacy, comprehensiveness and representativeness of the items, and the sentences revealing favoritism in the administration of education were made. Respondents were asked to rate on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=overwhelmingly agree).

In order to determine the structural validity of the prepared scale, a draft scale was applied to 120 teachers working in other 4 schools where the scale would not be applied. So as to determine the factor structure of the scale, data obtained from Favoritism in Educational Administration Scale applied to a group of 120 teachers was inspected. The process started by examining KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) value, giving information about whether or not the factor analysis is right, and by inspecting the Barlett test (Barlett Test of Sphericity)'s results, and deciding whether or not there is a correlation between variables. Moreover, it was taken into consideration that the number of factors in the model is equal to the number of factors in the Eigenvalue which are higher than one and the conditions that factor loadings are higher than or at least .35. In order to measure the structural validity of the scale, factor analysis was then applied. In measurement of the scale reliability, the Cronbach-Alpha coherent coefficient and the reliability coefficients pertaining to sub-dimensions of the scale were measured.

The analysis started with 67 items. Examining the first results of the factor analysis, it was observed that the factor loadings of 27 items were below .35 or that more than one factor had higher loadings. Such items were removed and factor analysis was applied again for the remaining 40 items. After the rotation process was carried out by fundamental components and Varimax techniques, 14 factors were determined as having more than 1.00 Eigenvalues. However, due to the abundance of the number of factors, it was investigated whether or not to remove some factors. Thus Cattell's "Scree" test was applied and the graph in Figure 1 was the result.




Figure 1. Scree test graph.

In the “Scree” test graph, the point at which the quick decrease is observed starts after the point of the third factor, which serves to limit the number of factors as three. Eigenvalues, percents of variation, and total percents of variations for these three factors are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1
The Factors’ Structure of Favoritism in Educational Administration Scale

| Factor | Eigenvalue | Percent of variance | Total percent of variance |
|--------|------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | 9.97 | 23.74 | 23.74 |
| 2 | 5.15 | 12.27 | 36.01 |
| 3 | 5.04 | 12.01 | 48.03 |

As seen in Table 1, Eigenvalues of three factors in the scale are 9.97, 5.15, and 5.04, respectively. The percents of the variation factors explained are 23.74, 12.27, and 12.01, respectively. All of the three factors explain 48.03 % of the total variation. This amount of variation, which is above the acceptable amount, 41%, (Kline, 1994), can result in evaluating the scale consisting of three factors. Nevertheless, in the validity studies of the scale, as a first step, the suitability of data to the sampling group was determined to be 0.000, the KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) value was found to be 0.84, and the Barlett Test value was measured to be 3742.40.

After these pre-evaluations, in order to place the 40 items into three groups, a rotation process was applied by fundamental components and the Varimax technique. The items having a factor loading of at least .35 were used. Moreover, the difference between the highest loading of an item in a factor and the loading of the same item in other factors would be at least .10. Therefore, independence among factors was increased (Büyüköztürk, 1996). Factor distributions of the items and factor loadings are indicated in Table 2 in accordance with the analysis and rotation results.

Table 2
Varimax Factor Loadings and Reliability Analysis for Favoritism in Educational Administration

| Factors | Items | Factor Loadings | Item Total Correlations |
|---|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Favoritism in the Central Administration in Ministry of National Education (Factor I) | 1 | .50 | .43 |
| | 2 | .43 | .39 |
| | 3 | .48 | .48 |
| | 4 | .50 | .67 |
| | 5 | .55 | .50 |
| | 6 | .55 | .47 |
| | 7 | .46 | .51 |
| | 8 | .53 | .45 |
| | 9 | .58 | .41 |
| | 10 | .67 | .46 |
| | 11 | .65 | .50 |
| | 12 | .65 | .36 |
| | 13 | .65 | .51 |
| | 14 | .42 | .51 |
| | 15 | .46 | .61 |

Cronbach-Alpha=.84

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------|----|-----|-----|
| | 16 | .57 | .60 |
| | 17 | .61 | .58 |
| Favoritism in the Provincial | 18 | .69 | .52 |
| Education Directorate | 19 | .68 | .56 |
| (Factor II) | 20 | .47 | .67 |
| | 21 | .54 | .80 |
| Cronbach-Alpha=.88 | 22 | .68 | .72 |
| | 23 | .75 | .50 |
| | 24 | .78 | .44 |
| | 25 | .81 | .77 |
| | 26 | .85 | .80 |
| | 27 | .75 | .73 |
| | 28 | .85 | .80 |
| | 29 | .85 | .78 |
| Favoritism in School Administration | 30 | .72 | .68 |
| (Factor III) | 31 | .62 | .61 |
| | 32 | .61 | .61 |
| | 33 | .42 | .39 |
| Cronbach-Alpha=.94 | 34 | .64 | .61 |
| | 35 | .69 | .69 |
| | 36 | .70 | .66 |
| | 37 | .48 | .37 |
| | 38 | .82 | .74 |
| | 39 | .72 | .77 |
| | 40 | .69 | .71 |
| Cronbach-Alpha of the Total Scale=.93 | | | |

As seen in Table 2, factor loadings for 40 items in the scale vary from .42 to .85. Varimax rotation results reveal that 40 items assemble into three clear factors. The first factor, named “favoritism in central administration in the ministry of national education”, is defined by 15 items and illustrates 23.74 % of the total variance. Item total correlations also range from .36 to .67, which shows that the items possess distinguishing qualities. The second factor, named “favoritism in the provincial education directorate”, has nine items and illustrates 36.01% of the total variance. Item total correlations vary from .44 to .80. The third factor, named “favoritism in school administration” is composed of 16 items and illustrates 48.03 % of the total variance. Item total correlations vary from .37 to .80. According to the analysis, the general reliability coefficient Cronbach-Alpha rate was .93. The Cronbach-Alpha measures for the central administration were .84, for the provincial education directorate they were .88, and for school administration they were .94.

Results

From the teachers’ point of view, whether favoritism is experienced in the central administration of national education, in provincial education administration, and in school administration or not was evaluated in terms of school (primary and secondary), gender and seniority variables. The reason to analyze the matter in terms of gender variable was to determine whether teachers’ believes about favoritism changes according to males and females. The reason to analyze from school aspect was to find out whether school conditions are affecting in teachers’ believes, or not. The reason to analyze according to seniority variable

was to determine whether teachers' beliefs about favoritism are shaped by their professional experience in teaching, or not.

For gender and school level variables, a t-test was used and for seniority, variable one way-ANOVA analysis was conducted.

Table 3 indicates that a difference on if favoritism exists in the applications of the central administrators employed in the Ministry of National Education has not emerged among teachers ($t=0.46$, $p=.64$). However, teachers employed in primary schools ($x=3.70$) and secondary schools ($x=3.73$) are more likely to "agree strongly" that there is favoritism in the central administration of the Ministry of National Education. Teachers employed in primary and secondary schools are likely to "agree" that there is favoritism in the administrative applications of provincial education directorate and their school administration. No significant difference has emerged among teachers' beliefs (provincial education directorate $t=1.42$, $p=.15$; school administration $t=.78$, $p=.43$).

Table 3
T- Test Results: Favoritism in Educational Administration in Terms of School Level

| Factors | School Level | N | Mean | Sd | df | t | p |
|--|------------------|-----|------|------|-----|------|-----|
| Central Administration in the Ministry of National Education | Secondary School | 138 | 3.73 | .63 | 286 | .46 | .64 |
| | Primary School | 150 | 3.70 | .56 | | | |
| The Provincial Education Directorate | Secondary School | 138 | 3.37 | .85 | 286 | 1.42 | .15 |
| | Primary School | 150 | 3.25 | .62 | | | |
| School Administration | Secondary School | 138 | 3.27 | 1.02 | 286 | .78 | .43 |
| | Primary School | 150 | 3.35 | .76 | | | |

There was not any significant difference among the opinions of male and female teachers about the central administration in the Ministry of National Education, the provincial education directorate, and school administration in general (central administration in the Ministry of National Education $t = .29$; $p=.76$, the provincial education directorate $t =.55$; $p=.58$, and the school administration $t=1.35$; $p=.17$). According to the Table 4, both male and female teachers are more likely to "agree strongly" that favoritism comes up in the central administration of the Ministry of National Education and "agree" that favoritism takes place in the provincial education directorate and the school administration.

Table 4
T-Test Results: Favoritism in Educational Administration and Gender

| Factors | Gender | N | Mean | Sd | df | t | p |
|--|--------|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|
| Central Administration in the Ministry of National Education | Female | 164 | 3.71 | .52 | 283 | .29 | .76 |
| | Male | 121 | 3.73 | .69 | | | |
| The Provincial Education Directorate | Female | 164 | 3.28 | .72 | 283 | .55 | .58 |
| | Male | 121 | 3.33 | .76 | | | |
| School Administration | Female | 164 | 3.36 | .88 | 283 | 1.35 | .17 |
| | Male | 121 | 3.22 | .90 | | | |

Table 5, which shows teachers' beliefs about three aspects of favoritism in terms of promotion variable, makes it clear that all teachers, regardless of their employment period, are more likely to "agree strongly" with the statement that favoritism exists in the central administration of the Ministry of National Education. No significant difference has emerged among teachers' beliefs (Central Organization $F=.64$, $p=.66$).

Table 5
ANOVA Test Results: Favoritism in Educational Administration and Seniority

| Factors | Variance Source | Total Square | Square Mean | sd | F | p |
|--|-----------------|--------------|-------------|------|------|------|
| Central Administration in the Ministry of National Education | Inter groups | 1.16 | .23 | 5 | .64 | .66 |
| | In-groups | 101.643 | .36 | 282 | | |
| | Total | 102.811 | | 287 | | |
| The Provincial Education Directorate | Inter groups | 2.8 | .57 | 5 | 1.05 | .39 |
| | In-groups | 155.830 | .55 | 282 | | |
| | Total | 158.716 | | 287 | | |
| School Administration | Inter groups | 32.077 | 6.41 | 5 | 9.11 | .00* |
| | In-groups | 198.566 | .70 | 282 | | |
| | Total | 230.643 | | 287 | | |
| Favoritism results in terms of seniority variable | | | | | | |
| Factors | Groups | N | Mean | Sd | | |
| Central Administration in the Ministry of National Education | 1-5 years | 75 | 3.68 | .54 | | |
| | 6-10 years | 72 | 3.66 | .48 | | |
| | 11-15 years | 68 | 3.82 | .41 | | |
| | 16-20 years | 30 | 3.73 | .80 | | |
| | 21-25 years | 29 | 3.73 | .37 | | |
| | 26+ years | 14 | 3.64 | 1.48 | | |
| | Total | 288 | 3.72 | .59 | | |
| The Provincial Education Directorate | 1-5 years | 75 | 3.26 | .64 | | |
| | 6-10 years | 72 | 3.34 | .69 | | |
| | 11-15 years | 68 | 3.28 | .72 | | |
| | 16-20 years | 30 | 3.27 | .74 | | |
| | 21-25 years | 29 | 3.57 | .55 | | |
| | 26+ years | 14 | 3.12 | 1.53 | | |
| | Total | 288 | 3.31 | .74 | | |
| School Administration | 1-5 years | 75 | 3.46 | .85 | | |
| | 6-10 years | 72 | 3.46 | .70 | | |
| | 11-15 years | 68 | 3.37 | .81 | | |
| | 16-20 years | 30 | 2.97 | .99 | | |
| | 21-25 years | 29 | 3.41 | .77 | | |
| | 26+ years | 14 | 1.98* | 1.22 | | |
| | Total | 288 | 3.31 | .89 | | |

While the teachers employed for 21-25 years are likely to “agree strongly” that favoritism exists in the provincial education directorate, others are more likely to simply “agree” with the existence of favoritism. As indicated in the ANOVA test results in Table 5, no significant difference among teachers’ beliefs about the promotion variable (provincial education directorate $F = 1.04$, $p=.39$) has emerged.

However, there is some difference among teachers’ beliefs about the applications of school administration ($F = 9.11$, $p=.00$). Accordingly, while the teachers employed for 26 years or more are likely to merely “agree”, the teachers employed for 1-10 years and 21-25 years are more likely to “agree strongly”, and the teachers employed for 16-20 years are more likely to “agree” with the existence of favoritism in school administration.

Teachers agree strongly with the existence of favoritism in the central administration in the Ministry of National Education in terms of school (primary school and secondary school), gender, and seniority variables.

Favoritism in the Central Administration in the Ministry of National Education

It is indicated in Table 6 that the teachers employed in primary and secondary schools “agree strongly” with the statement that the practices of some central administrators in the Ministry of National Education bear favoritism (Table 6).

Table 6
Favoritism in Central Administration in Ministry of National Education

| No | Items | X | Sd |
|----|---|------|------|
| 1 | Administrators appoint their fellow countrymen. | 4.05 | .830 |
| 2 | Politicians are more likely to favor someone. | 4.02 | .908 |
| 3 | Favoritism is experienced in appointment of school administrators. | 3.98 | .851 |
| 4 | Administrators appoint their relatives. | 3.95 | .936 |
| 5 | Administrators appoint those having similar political view with them. | 3.95 | .935 |
| 6 | Administrators appoint their friends. | 3.94 | .865 |
| 7 | Favoritism is experienced in some situations such as providing public housing and appointment to abroad. | 3.87 | .963 |
| 8 | Favoritism is not considered to be unethical. | 3.86 | 1.12 |
| 9 | Administration exams could not prevent favoritism. | 3.82 | 1.11 |
| 10 | Favoritism is experienced in choosing schools to take part in activities. | 3.81 | 1.10 |
| 11 | Bureaucrats are more likely to favor someone. | 3.78 | .960 |
| 12 | Personal performance, skill, success and education level are not taken into consideration in appointment. | 3.72 | 1.18 |
| 13 | Favoritism is more frequently experienced in promotion to a higher position. | 3.72 | .925 |
| 14 | There exists favoritism in the appointment of teachers to other provinces. | 3.71 | 1.08 |
| 15 | Favoritism is experienced in the distribution of materials to schools. | 3.71 | 1.08 |

It is also brought out in Table 6 that the teachers employed in primary and secondary schools “agree strongly” with all items. The second item, “Politicians are more likely to favor someone” and the eleventh item, “Bureaucrats are more likely to favor someone” point out that the teachers are inclined to believe that in the central administration in the Ministry of National Education, both bureaucrats and politicians are likely to apply favoritism. The second item indicates that politicians are likely to exert pressure on the central administrators in the Ministry of National Education. As a result, teachers agree that central administrators show favoritism in:

- a) Appointing school administrators
- b) Providing public housing and appointments abroad
- c) Choosing schools to take part in activities
- d) Promotion to higher positions
- e) Aforementioned appointment of teachers to other provinces
- f) Distribution of materials to schools.

“Personal performance, skill, success, and education level are not taken into consideration in appointment”, showing the indication of favoritism is another finding that can be deduced from Table 6.

That the respondents “agreed strongly” with the statement “Administration exams could not prevent favoritism”, and merely “agreed” with the existence of favoritism “In appointment of school administrators” is very striking because in Turkey a central examination is held to appoint school administrators and only those meeting legal requirements can become administrators.

According to the Regulation for the Appointment and Nomination of Educational Institutions Administrators in the structure of the Ministry of National Education in Turkey (Official Gazette dated 04.03.2006), administrators of the following units are appointed directly by the ministry:

- a) Educational institutions in the service of the Ministry of National Education.
- b) Other secondary schools at the same level as Anatolian secondary schools.
- c) Science secondary schools
- d) Social sciences secondary schools
- e) Sports secondary schools

- f) Local primary boarding schools
- g) Teachers' guest houses and evening art schools

In order to appoint administrators of other schools, Level Determining Exams are held in centers determined by the ministry.

With the exception of the circumstances listed below, administrators of schools in the Turkish education system are changed every 5 years in accordance with the following criteria:

- a) Educational administrators who are forced to work in a different school as a result of judicial and administrative investigation are to work in the same type of school inside or outside the province.
- b) Administrators whose success level is twice evaluated below "good" in the last two years are to work in the same type of school in the province.
- c) Educational administrators appointed by the ministry or governorship are forced to work in a different place in the same type of school in the province in accordance with their preferences and scores.

The fact that the teachers surveyed accept the existence of favoritism in the appointment of school administrators is valid for the administrators employed in schools determined by the government since printed and visual media has frequently indicated that the practice of favoritism exists with political pressure and central bureaucrats. However, the fact that teachers think the practice of favoritism has existed in the administrator appointment exam is a crucial matter which should be taken into consideration by those who play large roles in the construction of the educational system, because it is necessary to do away with teachers' belief that "Favoritism is not considered to be unethical".

Favoritism in the Provincial Education Directorate

Teachers employed in primary and secondary schools "agreed strongly" that favoritism has existed in:

- a) Tender and completion of investments
- b) Opening private schools, courses, and private teaching institutions
- c) Recording personal affairs
- d) Distributing funds reserved for national education services to schools
- e) Getting use of buildings, establishments, materials provided by the ministry (Table 7).

Table 7

Favoritism in the Provincial Education Directorate

| Number | Items | X | Sd |
|--------|--|------|------|
| 1 | Favoritism is experienced in tender and completion of investments. | 4.00 | 1.05 |
| 2 | Favoritism is experienced in opening private schools, courses and private teaching institutions. | 3.63 | 1.07 |
| 3 | Favoritism is experienced in recording personal affairs. | 3.61 | 1.15 |
| 4 | Favoritism is experienced in distributing funds reserved for national education services to schools. | 3.56 | .989 |
| 5 | Favoritism is experienced in getting use of buildings, establishments, materials provided by the ministry. | 3.43 | 1.24 |
| 6 | Favoritism is experienced in maintenance of computer laboratories. | 3.35 | 1.11 |
| 7 | Favoritism is experienced in appointment of teachers to schools. | 3.31 | 1.11 |
| 8 | Favoritism is experienced in providing educational materials for schools. | 3.28 | 1.12 |
| 9 | Favoritism is experienced in selecting teachers to join in-service seminars and courses | 3.27 | 1.04 |

Teachers also “agree” that favoritism has existed in the following practices:

- a) Maintaining computer laboratories
- b) Appointing teachers to schools
- c) Providing educational materials for schools
- d) Selecting teachers to join in-service seminars and courses

The above-mentioned statements about the existence of favoritism in the provincial education directorate were also indicated during informal interviews with school administrators. Since some school administrators have close relationships with provincial education administrators, they have priority treatment in some services such as supplying maintenance, required educational materials, and teaching staff.

Favoritism in School Administration

Teachers employed in primary and secondary schools “agreed strongly” with 8 items and “agreed” with eight other items about the existence of favoritism. Teachers “agreed strongly” with the following items (Table 8):

- a) Favoritism exists in teachers’ having permission
- b) Favoritism exists in teachers’ beginning courses and leaving classrooms on time
- c) Favoritism exists in selecting teachers to join activities which will be useful in their career
- d) Favoritism exists in some cases of contradiction to regulations and malpractice determined throughout inspections
- e) Favoritism exists in teachers’ disobeying rules (such as clothing and participating in ceremonies)
- f) Favoritism exists in teaching simultaneously in other schools
- g) Favoritism exists in inspectors’ evaluations about the performance and behaviors of administrators and teachers
- h) Favoritism exists in revealing teachers’ failure to carry out their duties as required.

It is possible to state that favoritism in the practice of school administrators exists in favor of their relatives, friends, fellow countrymen and those who share their own political views in the above-indicated situations.

Table 8
Favoritism in School Administration

| Number | Items | X | Sd |
|--------|--|------|------|
| 1 | Favoritism exists in teachers’ having permission. | 3.69 | 1.27 |
| 2 | Favoritism exists in teachers’ beginning course and leaving classroom on time. | 3.69 | 1.25 |
| 3 | Favoritism exists in selecting teachers to join activities which will be useful in their career. | 3.64 | 1.27 |
| 4 | Favoritism exists in some cases of contradiction to regulations and malpractice determined throughout inspections. | 3.59 | 1.07 |
| 5 | Favoritism exists in teachers’ disobeying rules. | 3.45 | 1.30 |
| 6 | Favoritism exists in teaching also in other schools. | 3.43 | 1.28 |
| 7 | Favoritism exists in inspectors’ evaluations about the performance and behaviors of administrators and teachers. | 3.41 | 1.17 |
| 8 | Favoritism exists in revealing teachers not carrying out their duties as required. | 3.41 | 1.27 |
| 9 | Favoritism exists in selecting teachers to take part in activities from which they can benefit financially. | 3.39 | 1.14 |
| 10 | Favoritism exists in inspecting teacher plans. | 3.34 | 1.32 |
| 11 | Favoritism exists in distribution and use of materials inside schools | 3.30 | 1.34 |
| 12 | Favoritism exists in giving qualification marks to teachers | 3.22 | 1.22 |

| | | | |
|----|--|------|------|
| 13 | Favoritism exists in observing teaching performance in classroom | 3.11 | 2.37 |
| 14 | Favoritism exists in deficiency and faultiness inside or outside classroom precautions to be taken | 3.02 | 1.24 |
| 15 | Favoritism exists in distribution of classes to teachers | 2.98 | 1.31 |
| 16 | Favoritism exists in preparing timetables for teachers' watch turns | 2.83 | 1.17 |

The facts that the teachers “agree” with the existence of favoritism in selecting teachers to take part in activities from which they can benefit financially, in inspecting teachers’ plans, in the distribution and use of materials inside schools, in giving qualification marks to teachers, in observing teaching performance in the classroom, in the deficiency and faultiness inside or outside classroom to take precautions, in the distribution of classes to teachers, and in preparing timetables for teachers’ watch turns should not be underestimated. However, it shows that school administrators are more sensible about these items.

Conclusion

In this study, the question of whether the practice of favoritism exists in the central administration in the Ministry of National Education, in the provincial education directorate and in school administration in general is evaluated in terms of school (primary school and secondary school), gender, and seniority variables. For gender and school variables a t-test was used and for seniority variable one-way ANOVA analyses was conducted.

Teachers employed in primary and secondary schools accept the existence of favoritism in the practice of administrators appointed to the central provincial directorate and the school administration of the Turkish educational system. Favoritism exists in the appointment of central administrators, school administrators and teachers, in the distribution of materials to schools, in choosing schools to take part in activities, and in providing public housing and appointments abroad by the administrators who favor their relatives, friends, fellow countrymen and those who share their political views regardless of their success and abilities. Teachers indicated that favoritism was not considered unethical in the Ministry of National Education. Another significant result of the study is the teachers’ agreement that favoritism even exists in school administration exams.

Teachers state that favoritism is experienced to a considerable extent in the provincial education directorate as well as in the Ministry of National Education. Teachers indicate that the practice of favoritism takes place in the tender and completion of investments, in opening private schools, in the courses and private teaching institutions, in recording personal affairs, in distributing funds reserved for national education services to schools, in obtaining the use of buildings, establishments, and materials provided by the ministry, as well as in the maintenance of computer laboratories, the appointment of teachers to schools, and in providing educational materials for schools. Favoritism flourishes in these areas as administrators use it to bestow favor upon their friends, fellow countrymen and those who share their political views, as well as those in the central education directorate. It is also significant that favoritism is experienced in selecting teachers to join in-service seminars and courses although all teachers have the right to take part in these seminars and courses.

Since teachers have more sincere relationships among their colleagues in the schools in which they work, they all share what they have learned about positive and negative practices of school administrators and they discuss these amongst themselves. Teachers also state that favoritism exists in situations of teachers’ having permission for any reasons such as family, personal and so on, beginning courses and leaving the classroom on time, in selecting teachers

to join activities which will be useful in their career from which they can benefit financially, and even in teachers' dressing properly, although it is clearly defined in regulation officially is an extremely prominent finding of the study. Since it is known that favoritism flourishes among administrators' relatives, friends, and those who share their political beliefs, it is possible to claim that the working atmosphere at schools do not increase productivity.

In light of these findings, it is suggested that attempts should be taken to avoid favoritism in all grades of the educational system. In particular, ability and achievement should be emphasized as indispensable criteria. In order to realize this, first of all, legal proceedings should be regulated so as to remove political pressure from educational institutions. Opening administrative departments at universities by means of cooperation with the higher education institutions would be another beneficial action. Rating requirements in specific subjects rather than seniority is likely to be more effective than to remove the aforementioned unfavorable aspects.

Furthermore, administrators employed in the central or local institutions of the Ministry of National Education should carry out certain principles indicated below (Morettini, 2005):

- a) Performance criteria should be based on proceedings about educational staff employed in schools, as well as the central and provincial education directorate.
- b) Everyone should be treated fairly.
- c) Empathy should be developed with personnel.
- d) Secure atmospheres should be provided in which personnel can talk about any situation which they consider unfair.
- e) Relatives should be kept away as much as possible; barring that, relatives should be held to the same high standards of performance as non-relatives.

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